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AGENCY-LIABILITY OF AGENT ON CONTRACT FOR PRINCIPAL-EFFECT
OF ADDING "AGENT" TO SIGNATURE-Defendant, a real estate broker pur, porting to act for X, made a contract with plaintiff for the sale to plaintiff of
X's farm. The only evidence in the writing of defendant's agency was the word
"agent" which he appended to his signature.· Plaintiff paid defendant $ I 000.00
as a deposit which defendant tendered to X who returned $500.00 to defendant
as his commission for the sale. Upon destruction of an important part of the
premises before execution of the contract, plaintiff brought suit against X and
defendant to rescind the contract and recover the deposit.1 Recovery against X
was lrmited to $500'.oo which X had already returned before suit, and the bill
was dismissed as to defendant. Upon plaintiff's appeal, Held: defendant was
liable in the sum of $500.00 as a party to the contract, the word "agent" being
sufficient neither to indicate that he acted solely in a representative capacity nor
to raise an ambiguity as to parties. Bissonnette v. Keyes, (Mass. 1946) 64

N.E. (2d) 926.
When a duly appointed agent of another, actint within the scope of his
authority, signs a simple contract which purports to obligate him personally, the

1 Under the rule in Massachusetts where the subject matter of an executory
contract for the conveyance of real property is destroyed or materially damaged, the
loss is borne by the vendor. The court in the principal case cites Libman v. Levenson,
236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920), and the cases and discussion in 22 A.L.R. 575
(1923). This is the minority view.

RECENT DECISIONS

unvarying rule is that the agent himself is bound as a party to the contract.2
Conversely it is equally clear that where the writing indicates unequivocally that
the agent acted only as the representative of his principal, the principal and not
the agent is obligated.8 The instant case poses the problem of determining the
parties to a contract where an agent appears to have acted on his own behalf
except for the appending of some word after his signature suggestive of a representative capacity.4 The weight of authority is for the proposition that where
an agent signs simply as "agent," or as "trustee" or "director," and the contract
does not name his principal or otherwise set forth the agency relationship, the
added word is merely descriptio personae or "descriptive of the person" of the
agent and not indicative of the capacity in which he acts. 5 It is conceded, however, that where there are elements in a contract executed by an agent which
render it ambiguous as to parties, extrinsic evidence may be examined to determine the intention of the signers; 6 and there is authority to the effect that the
addition to the agent's signature of a word describing him as such gives rise to
an ambiguity explainable by this method.1 Sometimes it is stated that a contract
signed in this fashion is prima facie the contract of the agent but that other evidence may be introduced to prove a different intent. 8 The court in the principal
case adopts the view, however, that a writing in this form is not ambiguous and
must be taken to bind the agent personally.9 It must be confessed that however
much various courts and textbook writers have spoken 9f the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intention of the signers under these facts, the
· cases where such evidence has been admitted to relieve the agent appear to be
few. 10 Investigation reveals that in many cases where the rule in general terms
2 STORY, AGENCY, 9th ed., §155 (1882); MECHEM, AGENCY, §447 (1889);
WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., §284 (1936); 32 C.J.S., Evidence, §991a.
8 STORY, AGENCY, 9th ed., §154 (1882); MECHEM, AGENCY, §446 (1889);
2 C.J.S., Agency, §127.
4 The specific question here involved is discussed at length and numerous cases
cited in 42 L.R.A.(NS) 1 at 16 (1923).
5 MECHEM, AGENCY, §447 (1889); 2 C.J.S., Agency, §127 d (3) (d).
See
the oft quoted opinion of Shaw, C.J., in Simonds v. Heard, 40 Mass. 120 at 126
(1839). The court in Anthony v. Comstock, 1 R.I. 454 at 462 (1851), terms the
word "agent'' thus used as "merely a descriptive epithet." In I AGENCY RESTATEMENT,
§156, comment b (1933), it is said that the descriptive term serves only to inform
the other party to the contract "that the agent is conducting the transaction as a
fiduciary." The general view has not gone unchallenged, however. See the vigorous
criticism of it in Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535 (1857).
6 MECHEM, AGENCY, §449 (1889); 32 C.J.S., Evidence, §991 a (1942). For
a recent Massachusetts decision applying this principle see Stem v. Lieberman, 307
Mass. 77, 29 N.E. (2d) 839 (1940), cited by the court in the principal case.
7 TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON AGENCY, 2d ed. by Powell, 337 (1924); 32 C.J.S.,
Evidence, §991 a; 2 AGENCY RESTATEMENT, §323 (2), comment d (1933). The
principle is not extended by the RESTATEMENT to negotiable instruments or contracts
under seal. I AGENCY RESTATEMENT, §156 (1933).
8 TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON AGENCY, 2d ed. by Powell, 337 (1924).
9 Principal case at 927.
10 In Haile v. Peirce, 32 Md. 327 (1870), parol evidence offered to rebut the
liability of agents was held improperly excluded by the lower court and a new trial
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is indeed approved, the purpose in admitting the extrinsic evidence was to establish the liability of the principal,11 or to prove that the signer described as an
agent was in fact a party and entitled to sue.12 Where extrinsic evidence has
been allowed to relieve the, agent, there has usually been a stronger ground for
treating the contract as ambiguous than merely that the agent described himself
as such after his signature.13 An interesting point related to this problem is raised
by the court's assumption in the instant case that the defendant's principal was
properly held liable on the contract, even though, by the court's interpretation,
the agency was in no way evidenced in the writing. The admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to prove the principal's liability is clearly contemplated here, and it
might be thought inconsistent not to allow such evidence to relieve the agent.
It appears to be well settled, however, that even where a contract is unambiguous in its terms and purports to bind the agent alone, the fact of agency and the
intention of one of the parties to bind the principal may be shown by other
evidence, although the agent is not thus enabled to avoid liability himself.14 The
rule is said to have been derived from the theory that "the act of the agent is
the act of the principal," 15 so that the principal is made a party to the contract
by the act of his agent even though his relation to the agent is not set forth. A
further explanation given for the rule is that the introduction of extrinsic eviwas awarded. The court in Clark v. Talbott, 7z W.Va. 46, 77 S.E. 523 (1913),
affirmed a judgment where parol evidence had been admitted to discharge an agent,
relying largely on the authority of Mechem who is quoted at length. In Pratt v.
Beaupre, 13 Gilfillan (Minn.) 177 (1868), and Solomon v. New Jersey Indemnity
Co., 94 N.J.L. 318, 110 A. 813 (1920), affirmed, 95 N.J.L. 545, 113 A. 927
(1921), the propriety of parol evidence to relieve the agents was upheld but the
evidence was insufficient. Southern Badge Co. v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 141
S.W. I 8 5, where the agent was allowed to escape liability by the use of parol evidence,
disclosed a slightly more ambiguous writing. Anthony v. Comstock, I R.I. 454 (1851),
cited in note 5, supra, and Norfolk County Trust Co. v. Green, 304 Mass. 406, 24
N.E. (2d) 12 (1939), offer examples of the cases where such contracts were held to
present no ambiguity.
11 Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.)
326 (1820); Deering v. Thom, 29 Minn. 120, 12 N.W. 350 (1882); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Von Schmidt Dredge Co., 118 Cal. 368, 50 P. 650 (1897); Keeley
Brewing Co. v. Neubauer Decorating Co., 194 Ill. 580, 62 N.E. 923 (1902).
12
Rhone v. Powell, 20 Colo. 41, 36 P. 899 (1894); Eddy v. American Amusement Co., 9 Cal. App. 624, 99 P. 1115 (1908).
13 Compare the situations in the following cases, for example: Peterson v. Homan,
44 Minn. 166, 46 N.W. 303 (1890); Ellis v. Stone, 21 N.M. 730, 158 P. 480
(1916); Stern v. Lieberman, 307 Mass. 77, 29 N.E. (2d) 839 (1940). In the second
case cited (Ellis v. Stone), the agent added the title "president'' to his signature but
the court was additionally influenced to treat the contract as ambiguous by its having
been written on the letterhead of the principal and by the occurrence of the words
"we" and "president" at a significant place in the text.
14 STORY, AGENCY, 9th ed., §160 a (1882}; Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834,
151 Eng. Rep. 1278 (1841) (STORY ON AGENCY cited with approval); Salmon Falls
Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 446 (1852) (Higgins v. Senior approved);
Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169 (1883). See also cases cited in 32 C.J.S., Evidence, §991 a (1942).
15
Opinion of Holmes, J., in Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169 at 170 (1883).
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dence to bind a principal not mentioned in the instrument only extends the
obligation of the contract and does not actually vary its terms since all who
appear to be parties on its face remain bound; while the use of such evidence
to discharge the agent varies the contract in relieving a party unequivocally obligated in the writing.16 If the result in the principal case seems unfair, it is
perhaps because it is not clearly evident that two persons who draw up a contract
for the sale to one of them of another person's land intend nothing by the addition of the word "agent" to the signature of the one who undertakes to convey.
Such a writing might at least be deemed ambiguous and other circumstances
considered in ascertaining its intent. There is reason and some authority for
h"
h 11
t lS approac ·
John A. Huston

Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834, 151 Eng. Rep. 1278 (1841).
Some might find merit in the dictum of the court in Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal.
53 5 at 538 ( I 857) : "For I cannot believe that a person signing his name and appending the word "agent'' to it, ever did intend anything else than a designation of the
capacity in which he acted."
16

17

